Sentence examples for sparse conception from inspiring English sources

It seems, then, that our first question has bite only if the sparse conception is true.

One motivation for accepting a sparse conception of propositions is expressivism in metaethics.

The question whether existence is a property of individuals is perhaps more straightforward on the sparse conception of properties.

Endorsing such a sparse conception of propositions thus leads to the surprising consequence all moral sentences lack truth-value.

So pluralists who want to give a non-concessive response to the metaphysical instability challenge may want to endorse the sparse conception (Pedersen 2006).

The truth property FU does not exist, because truth properties are to be thought of in accordance with the sparse conception.

According to sparse conceptions, not every syntactically well-formed predicate expresses a property.

Sparse conceptions will deny that having the relevant syntactic properties is sufficient for the expression and designation of propositions.

And some philosophers have rejected generous conceptions of properties in favour of sparse conceptions according to which only some predicates express properties.

In standard first-order logic predicates come with a fixed degree and in line with this relations are usually taken to have a fixed degree themselves (on abundant conceptions of properties, there are relations of every finite number of argument places, but on sparse conceptions it is an empirical question whether there are relations of any particular degree).

In discussing the question of whether there are properties, D. M. Armstrong (1989) distinguishes sparse from abundant conceptions of properties.