Experiential foundationalists claim that perception is a source of justification.
Hence they need to answer the J-question: Why is perception a source of justification?
Such examples make it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.
To raise problems for experiential foundationalism, coherentists could press the J-question: Why are perceptual experiences a source of justification?
The distinctively epistemological questions about memory are these: First, what makes memorial seemings a source of justification?
Or is memory a source of justification only if, as externalists would say, it is in fact reliable?
The externalist answer we just considered, however, implies that they would not be a source of justification.
It says merely that, if your perceptual experiences are a source of justification for you, you must have justification for believing them to be reliable.
Further, why should we accept the claim that a source of justification must be capable of being tested for its reliability?
Why, then, should we not be satisfied when independence foundationalists answer the J-question by saying that perceptual experiences are necessarily a source of justification?
According to this second answer to the J-question, perceptual experiences are a source of justification because we have justification for taking them to be reliable.
