Sentence examples for some other proposition from inspiring English sources

A deductive argument can be roughly characterized as one in which the claim is made that some proposition (the conclusion) follows with strict necessity from some other proposition or propositions (the premises)—i.e., that it would be inconsistent or self-contradictory to assert the premises but deny the conclusion.

No doubt this constraint sometimes correctly portrays the relevant evidential relationships when some proposition, p, entails some other proposition, q.

If it is false, some other proposition about how many sentences Austen wrote that day is true.

This amounts to the statement that if a proposition is impossible and follows from some other proposition, then this other proposition is impossible, too.

Then if p is true, it is our first truth; if p is false, some other proposition is true, e.g. non-p.

But S would also need to be justified in believing that F1 does in fact make likely that E1 makes likely P, a proposition he would need to infer from some other proposition G1, which he would need to infer from some other proposition G2, and so on.

If this person genuinely believes some other propositions, such as that her son is at school, with a "degree of belief" considerably less than.9999, then it appears to follow that a rational person may in some cases have a higher "degree of belief" in a proposition that she does not believe than in a proposition she does believe (see Harman 1986; Sturgeon 2008).

In an effort to explain all this, Chisholm started with a single primitive epistemic concept — this is the concept of greater reasonability, which relates the holding of one propositional attitude toward some proposition with the holding some other propositional attitude toward some proposition.

There is no reason to suppose that we would be unable to justify every proposition we believe by appeal to some other different proposition which we justifiably believe.

But in circumstances such as these, the proposition that you're the cream in my coffee reliably calls to mind a certain particular other proposition, "attributing to [you] some feature or features in respect of which [you] resemble (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance".

If one infers the existence of the probabilistic connections from the truth of some other different proposition F, then one not only needs justification for believing F, but, one needs justification for believing that F does indeed make probable that the probabilistic connection holds!