"situated knowledge" is a valid phrase that can be used in written English.
It refers to knowledge that is specific to a particular context or situation. This term is often used in fields such as sociology, anthropology, and gender studies. Example: "The anthropologist's understanding of the local culture was shaped by her situated knowledge acquired through years of living with the community."
By bringing together the general account of situated knowledge with the account of gender as a kind of social situation, we can generate a catalog of ways in which what people know, or think they know, can be influenced by their own gender (roles, norms, traits, performance, identities), other people's genders, or by ideas about gender (symbolism).
Continental traditions like Marxism and existential phenomenology have long emphasized such situated knowledge.
Narrator stories contain the situated knowledge of a community's struggle, knowledge that is produced in political struggle.
In this talk, I summarize a "modeler's manifesto" applying Haraway's concept of situated knowledge to modeling as a way of knowing.
What kind of situated knowledge could be learned from some of the possible representations of an architectural design composition is discussed.
Firstly, situated knowledge held by farmers and advisers leads to resistance, negotiation, and re-scripting of decision support tools, which are perceived to provide the 'view from nowhere'.
The speakers are indigenous scholars who use critical research methods grounded in their situated knowledges and commitments to indigenous voices, experiences and political rights to self-determination.
This day-long conference will celebrate and challenge the intellectual legacy of Donna Haraway's "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective". Presenters from various disciplines will reflect on the impact of "situated knowledges" while offering new perspectives on and revisions to the concept since its introduction.
Negotiating the bewildering array of situated knowledges therefore involves two types of epistemic practice.
Objectivity, on the other end, is situated and embodied; in Haraway's words: "Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges" [25].
By invoking situated knowledges, Haraway suggests that all knowledge is local and limited, denying the possibility of the impartial view-from-nowhere that has often been associated with the perspective of objective knowledge.
