The aforementioned works consider a one-shot interaction model; however, repeated interactions that take place over multiple stages seems more realistic.
Our experimental results indicate that participants systematically deviate from predictions by the normative model that assumes a one-shot interaction between self-interested players.
This paper investigates how social image concern affects favor transmission in one-shot interactions.
Moreover, cases where shot-shot interactions were accounted for yielded lower residual stresses and roughness than cases where such interactions were not accounted for.
Indeed, none of these evolutionary models explicitly predicts generosity in anonymous one-shot interactions.
A better understanding of reciprocity in one-shot interactions in all its different contexts can then be of particular relevance to the current economy.
Nevertheless, even in one-shot interactions humans tend to reciprocate, while this behavior is much more difficult to find in other species [10].
One can ask analogous questions about cooperation in anonymous one-shot interactions and the evolution of reciprocal strategies (Burnham and Johnson, 2005, Haley and Fessler, 2005, Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006, Burnham, 2013).
Experimental research has shown that individuals are willing to punish group members (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986), even in one-shot interactions (e.g., Shinada and Yamagishi 2007).
Proposers and Responders typically interact in a one-shot, anonymous interaction with a stranger, leaving the Responder no other recourse.
In a one-shot anonymous interaction, compared with the case when the behavior is simply observed by the audience, individuals' behaviors are more likely to reflect what they believe the audience thinks they should do when they must explain their decisions to the audience.
