Stephen Macedo, a political theorist at Princeton, has written, "Cherishing our 'epistemic diversity,' for Carter, seems to mean not only ignoring the political authority of shared reasons, but also requiring everyone to avoid challenging and criticizing other people's religious convictions".
This ignores the complexity which is introduced when we distinguish between shared reasons and shared standards.
The idea of publicity is frequently understood in terms of the publicity of shared reasons (see Rawls 2002, 173 for a connection between shared reasons and publicity).
Shareability is the strongest of the three requirements, as it combines the requirement of shared evaluative standards with the requirement of shared reasons.
Suppose Albert and Betty are the only members of the justificatory constituency and suppose there are no shared reasons that would justify accepting X.
When we act together as citizens through the state, we act on the basis of shared reasons, a common ideal of justice.
Only those rules can be considered legitimate to which all concerned parties can freely agree on the basis of universal, discursively applicable, commonly shared reasons.
Grant uses Google Hangouts to meet with people who want similar information or who have shared reasons to talk to him.
The reason for this is probably that the considerations of reasonable pluralism that drive theorists away from shared evaluative standards will have already been sufficient to drive them away from a shared reasons standard.
It is not hard to see how there is a sense in which this distinction divides reasons into the public and the non-public, as essentially shared reasons, unlike those that are not essentially shared, provide reasons for everyone who can promote the state of affairs in which people act in accordance with those reasons.
