On the cue, "Let's go fly," they were off to the hangar, preflighting as a team, with a shared intention of a safe change of command in moments that would instantly become memories to be cherished both now and then.
Our findings suggest that there may be a role for other healthcare professionals to interrupt patients' and physicians' shared intention of "not giving up," perhaps by timely initiation of end of life discussions.
Already in the first statement of his account he points out that it is "reductive in spirit" (Bratman 1999: 108) and clarifies that the core "claim is that shared intention consists primarily of attitudes of individuals and their interrelations" (1999: 129).
And Bratman 1993 thinks of a shared intention as a feature of a group of individuals (see below).
For, "if intentions are mental states, states which play a fundamental role in an agent's practical deliberation and volition, the prospect of a shared intention introduces the specter of shared mental states and hence shared minds"—which is something that philosophers have traditionally hoped to leave behind.
However, his conception suggests that a Searlean version may be the basic form of shared intention, and that a normatively stabilized conception of collective intentionality as developed by Gilbert may be adequate for the forms of shared intention coming a later stage in development.
It was suggested earlier (in Section 1) that thinking of a group as itself an agent and a subject of intentional states was not a good model or account of central forms of shared intention and activity.
If Tomasello is right in claiming that the basic capacity for shared intention precedes the development of a full theory of mind, this places tight conceptual restriction on an adequate analysis of basic shared intention, as such factors as common knowledge are ruled out.
Tomasello refers to Searle's, Gilbert's and Bratman's accounts, but remains largely noncommittal as to the question of what exactly the conception of shared intention he has in mind amounts to (Schmid 2012).
He argues that the sense in which friends share activity is not the sort of shared intention and plural subjecthood discussed in literature on shared intention within social philosophy (on which, see Tuomela 1995, 2007; Gilbert 1996, 2000, 2006; Searle 1990; and Bratman 1999), for such sharing of intentions does not involve the requisite intimacy of friendship.
A reply that is available within Bratman's account may refer to a presupposition of the formation of a shared intention.
