Sentence examples for shared criterion from inspiring English sources

How then should these different outcomes in what initially appears as a universally shared criterion be valued?

Shiva Naipaul, after a reading on Humberside, received just one question: "Do you live in a mud hut?" Nonetheless, Taylor has several middle-aged regrets about the decline of literary argument, and "the absence of any real aesthetic divide", which decline into a querulous grumble about the loss of shared criteria.

Currently, there are no shared criteria for t f calculation.

Just as there are shared criteria of 'rude' such that not just anything could be considered rude, she argued, there are shared criteria of moral concepts such that not just anything could be a moral virtue or obligation.

However, RV non-compaction has been rarely described [30], since shared criteria to distinguish between normal RV trabeculations and non-compacted pattern has not yet been codified, thus making findings easily undiagnosed by inexperienced readers.

Others suggest alternative methods for feminist theory that will minimize the emphasis on shared criteria of membership in a social group and stress instead the possibilities for alliances founded on non-identical connections (Young 1997; Heyes 2000; Cornell 2000).

To ensure satisfactory community assessment and method comparison, and to promote scientific progress, it is necessary to establish common standards and shared criteria that enable comparison and integration of different approaches.

It is clear that the strategies for the development and evaluation of the new vaccine candidates need to be standardized under shared criteria in order to understand their ability to induce protection [ 21] in animal models that mimic the key aspects of naturally occurring human tuberculosis [ 22].

Dworkin does not claim that we never share criteria for the application of a word: he says that there may be such shared, uncontroversial tests for the application of a word like 'book'book

He said that to think that disagreement about grounds is never possible, for the reason that to share a subject matter we must share criteria that define it, is a philosophical prejudice: he called the prejudice "the semantic sting" (see Dworkin 1986).

Instead of opposing the misconception that the language of the law can be meaningful only if lawyers share criteria for the truth of statements of law, Dworkin could oppose the misconception that the members of a community can make legal judgments only if they share uncontroversial tests of legal validity that exhaust the grounds on which such judgments are legally justified.