The argument states that a cognizer is able to understand some sentence in virtue of understanding another.
Similarly, two sentences, in virtue of being synonymous, can be said to have something in common, but that fact alone does not entail they are commonly related to a proposition.
So, according to this approach, the simple expressions of our language (i.e., names) are distinct from the complex expressions (i.e., sentences) by virtue of their own significata, that is by virtue of the different kinds of objects they make known.
The basic idea of Burley's theory of meaning is that the simple expressions in our language (i.e., names) are distinct from complex expressions (i.e., sentences) by virtue of their own significata, that is, by virtue of the different kinds of objects they signify.
These two writers were rarely "bold and clear" on the sentence level, a virtue trumpeted by the Hemingway App, but they were nuanced and thought-provoking.
The secondary Goal bias revealed by a more refined look at the results of Experiment 1 raises the question of whether Goal arguments always show increased occurrences of reference to pronouns in subsequent sentences simply in virtue of being Goals, or whether this increase occurs only in certain circumstances, as Goals are constructed into larger discourse structures.
If analytic, a sentence is true in virtue of the conventions of language.
This reply is problematic in that it implies that the multitude of native speakers of English who reject the logical positivists' account of meaning somehow cannot see that that sentence is true in virtue of the meaning of the word "meaning"—which is no technical term but a word of ordinary English).
This, however, is an unwelcome consequence because laws of the special sciences should be reconstructed as empirical statements—not as sentences being true in virtue of meaning.
That sentence, like Raúl's careerlong virtue, is an understatement.
