Sentence examples for sense certainty from inspiring English sources

In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel undertook a genuinely novel approach to the problem of knowledge, tracing the immanent movement of the "shapes of consciousness"—the different historical conceptions of knowledge from "sense certainty" through "perception," "force," "consciousness," "self-consciousness," "reason," "spirit," and finally "absolute knowing".

Adherence to these competing ideals (roughly: high informative content on the one hand, and sense-certainty on the other) is to be judged by their respective consequences.

(In contrast, being in the Phenomenology's Sense-certainty chapter was described as the known truth of the purported immediate sensory given the category that it was discovered to instantiate).

In this respect Peirce's position is akin the the anti-foundationalism of Hegel, who in the section "Sense-Certainty" of his Phaenomenologie des Geistes likewise rejected any form of epistemic foundationalism, especially any form based on Cartesian or Berkeleyan phenomenalism.

In contrast to the purported single object of Sense-certainty the object of Perception is taken as instantiating general properties: it is "a thing with many properties" (Phen: §112).

This allows Hegel to go beyond the determination of something as particular (suggesting the part-whole relation) to a more robust sense of singularity [Einzelheit] the sense of the pure thisness seen initially in the Phenomenology's Sense-certainty chapter, the truth of which was then shown to be Aristotle's idea of an individual thing's substantial form in the Perception chapter.

Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude.

The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty (that they were instances of generals) is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception (Wahrnehmung in German this term having the connotations of taking (nehmen) to be true (wahr)).

In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises as the fundamental objects known.

As in the case of Sense-certainty, here in the case of Perception, by following the protagonist consciousness's efforts to make this implicit criterion explicit, we see how the criterion generates contradictions that eventually undermine it as a criterion for certainty.

As he states in The Phenomenology of Spirit, "we find that neither the one nor the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated" (Hegel 1807, 59), because subject and object are both instances of a "this" and a "now," neither of which are immediately sensed.