Sentence examples for semantic facts from inspiring English sources

However, the number of patients showing two linguistic advantages conflicts with our third hypothesis about arithmetic facts being processed either phonologically as phonological facts (according to Dehaene) or semantically as semantic facts (according to Ashcraft).

The result of arithmetic fact retrieval being impaired in isolation from semantic and phonological fact retrieval would most likely be in line with Ashcraft's assumption [ 48] about a semantic network of arithmetic facts, under the assumption that arithmetic facts are semantically separate from semantic facts such as European capitals.

Although contradicting all of our assumptions, this pattern of results would most likely corroborate Ashcraft's assumption [ 48] about a semantic network of arithmetic facts, under the assumption that arithmetic facts are semantically separate from other semantic facts.

The epistemicist says that there are semantic facts that are beyond our possible knowledge.

Stalnaker's 2D matrices thus reflect metasemantic facts about interpretation, not semantic facts about the meanings of specific expressions.

Partee (1988) discusses Schiffer's arguments against compositionality, and explains that Schiffer does not make a sufficient distinction between semantic facts and psychological facts.

How the program goes about establishing this semantic fact depends, of course, on the calculus it implements.

But nonetheless, it does appear that there is an important semantic fact about truth in the paracomplete language, closely related to if not identical to a fact about truth per se, which the language cannot express.

Yet realists hold that the sentence "Socrates sneezed in his sleep the night before he took the hemlock" will be true if Socrates did sneeze then and false if he did not and that this is a significant semantic fact.

(If the reference of 'Phosphorus' was determined by a reference-fixing description together with the facts about which entity meets the description, then that fact itself is not a semantic fact, but a metasemantic one, i.e., it does not concern the question of what the meaning of the word is, but the question of how the meaning of the word is determined).

If, on the balance of considerations, epistemicism is thought to be the right theory of vagueness, then it is fair to simply deny M2, and say it could be a brute semantic fact that oj satisfies 'cloud' and ok does not.