Quite a detailed literature has ensued concerning self-verifying judgments; the interested reader is directed to the supplemental documents, The Epistemic Status of Self-Verifying Judgments, and A Problem with Critical Reasoning.
Byrne argues that reasoning in accord with the doxastic schema is in a certain sense self-verifying.
The claim is that some judgments about one's own thought contents (a.k.a., "second order" judgments) are self-verifying.
In experiments where people are given feedback that conflicts with their self-image, they are less likely to attend to it or remember it than when given self-verifying feedback.
In [4], the author proves a common fixed point theorem for two self-mappings verifying a contractive condition of integral type in G-metric spaces.
But the two main ingredients of all extensions are, basically, the same that we can find in the Banach contraction principle: a complete metric space and a self-mapping verifying a contractive condition.
Monologues are self-verifying and self-referencing, a world in their own right.
Monologues are self-verifying and self-referencing, a world in their own right, one with its own internal logic that strengthens with reiteration.
Pragmatists can have principles but not self-verifying ones; they renounce any certainties that are based on claims of universal necessity.
Plausibly, we do not satisfy (TC) when it comes to self-verifying judgments (see section 3.1).
And even armed with self-verifying judgments, Oscar apparently cannot discriminate in this way.
