After Fisher's r to z transformation the following mean reliability scores were obtained: maternal sensitivity r =.65, maternal control r =.77, maternal unresponsiveness r =.84, infant cooperation r =.56, infant compulsiveness r =.15, infant difficultness r =.61 and infant passivity r =.58.
Both BS-RS cooperation and RS-RS cooperation are supported.
RS-RS cooperation is not considered in this scenario since the RSs do not have large overlapping coverage area.
We propose a much more flexible scheme that supports also RS-RS cooperation and any MIMO scheme that is used in a system.
The results are depicted in Figure 8 and show improvements of up to 30% for regions where RS-RS cooperation can be applied compared to MSs that are served only by the BS.
Meanwhile, when one of p r, p p, and p s is regarded as a variable, the other two parameters are set to 10. From Figure 4, with the increase of p r, the cooperation capability and the mutual interference become more and more stronger, and the power of the self-interference, which affects the decoding at the Relay, becomes larger, too.
Small but significant mean effects on child internalizing symptoms were found for coparenting cooperation (r = −.13), agreement (r = −.20), conflict (r = .19), and triangulation (r = .21).21
If we normalise the payoffs for mutual cooperation R and mutual defection P to 1 and 0 respectively, social dilemmas can be described in game theoretic terms by two key parameters, the 'temptation' to cheat, T, and the 'sucker' reward for unilateral cooperation, S [10], [29] (Fig. 1a, methods).
If this is true, then decreasing the outcome of a reward trial (from 4 to 2 food pellets) while maintaining the level of temptation (6 pellets), should maintain the levels of alternation between T and S trials, while decrease the levels of mutual cooperation (R trials).
Payoffs in the generic game denote the temptation to defect (T), the reward for mutual cooperation (R), punishment for mutual defection (P), and the sucker's payoff (S).
According to Hamilton's rule, higher relatedness (r) between the species, higher fitness benefit (b) to the beneficiary, and lower fitness cost (c) to the altruist will ensure better cooperation (r × b – c >0) [ 33].
