How do Fischer and Ravizza stave off manipulation cases involving freedom-and-responsibility-undermining implantation of reasons-responsive mechanisms?
Based on our findings, we suggest a few strategies to control air-pollution in China: (1) designing differentiated sectoral control strategies by considering supply chain; (2) establishing a regional responsibility sharing mechanism for air pollutants emissions; and (3) using pricing mechanisms to implement internalize the emissions along the supply chain.
The guardian model is a set of primitives, responsibilities, and mechanisms aimed at supporting the definition of exception handling models, in particular ones that require coordination.
"While resettlement is a limited solution and is conducted at the discretion of resettlement countries, it is an important protection tool and responsibility-sharing mechanism for the growing number of displaced people around the world," it said.
Fischer and Ravizza maintain that when an agent does come to take responsibility for her mechanisms of action through this means, she owns her mechanisms of action, and when they are moderately responsive to reasons, then she acts with guidance control and has satisfied the freedom-relevant condition for morally responsible agency.
According to Fischer and Ravizza, an agent's mechanism is appropriately reasons-responsive, and issues in conduct constitutive of guidance control, only if she has come to own that mechanism by means of a process whereby she takes responsibility for the mechanisms giving rise to her actions (1998, pp. 207-39).
The problem is that Fischer and Ravizza do not (and perhaps cannot) foreclose a kind of manipulation whereby part of the way the agent is manipulated is by way of causing all of the subjective processes through which she takes responsibility for the mechanisms of her actions (see, e.g., McKenna, 2000; Mele, 2000; Stump, 1996b, and 2002; and D. Zimmerman, 2002).
And this causal process is very different from one that, even at a determined world, is the outgrowth of an agent coming to take responsibility for the mechanisms (or springs) of her own actions as she grows out of childhood and into adulthood.
Note that, according to Pereboom (2001, p. 121), his Four-Case Argument can be adjusted so that the details of how the agents in each of his first three cases are manipulated will include causes about how the agents come to view themselves subjectively and thereby take responsibility for their mechanisms of action.
