The argument that epiphenomenalism is self-stultifying in the way just described rests on the premise that knowledge of a mental event requires causation by that mental event.
And it is surely an objective (although non-trivial) fact that our experience of A will be causally between A and our experience of B. Now if perspectivalism cannot answer the challenge to explain the truth of the above principle, it seems that our experience of temporal asymmetry, insofar as it has a causal explanation, requires causation to be objectively asymmetric.
The interpolated, albeit vague, conditions that require causation in 'the right way' are meant to cover well-known counterexamples that depend upon deviant causal chains occurring either in the course of the agent's practical reasoning or in the execution of his intentions.
Likewise, one need not require that causation embody the Humean condition of temporal priority, but may treat causation conditionally, or perhaps even, as traditionally, a relation of production.
If free will requires agent causation, and if such a thing is possible, that is another requirement about which we lack evidence.
Parametric inversion requires simple causation and "a great deal of a priori knowledge".
The principles of moral reasoning and discourse require effective causation in order to realize agency.
Since the settings can be made after the emission of the particle pair from the source, this kind of violation of λ-independence would require backward causation.
For another example, it has been argued that singular causal statements cannot be analyzed in terms of a causal connective (essentially for reasons having to do with the above-mentioned slingshot argument) but rather require that causation be treated as a binary relation holding between individual events [Davidson 1967b].
As correlation is not same as causation, however, further experiments are required to establish causation in each case.
