For theorists who adopt the mental representation view of concepts, concepts are identified with these more basic representations.
Advocates of the mental representation view would respond to these arguments by invoking the type/token distinction with respect to mental representations.
According to the mental representation view, concepts that haven't been acquired are just representations of a type that have never been tokened (Margolis & Laurence 2007).
Undoubtedly, from Dummett's perspective, philosophers who embrace the mental representation view also embrace RTM, and RTM, as he sees it, is fundamentally misguided.
But since Millikan thinks of concepts as abilities to produce and use representations, it is perhaps best to consider her a proponent of the mental representation view regarding ontology.
Before proceeding with the actual depth processing task, the characteristics of the representation view-plus-depth were overviewed, including methods of depth image based rendering for virtual view generation, and formulation of the depth map filtering problem.
The representation view gives rise to a problem however, for it turns out that what we have been calling word tokens aren't words at all on this view, anymore than a map of a planet is a planet, and this runs contrary to our usual thinking.
Furthermore, we plan to collect more annotations, develop additional strategies for function annotation and generate an enhanced cluster representation view.
In this scene representation, virtual views are synthesized using depth image based rendering (DIBR) [3].
