Sentence examples for reporting sentence from inspiring English sources

But there is a less ambitious reduction that she may well find congenial: Namely, for any true de re reporting sentence, there is a true de dicto reporting sentence.

But these conditions stem not from the information semantically encoded by a given utterance of a propositional attitude reporting sentence but instead from the information pragmatically implicated by those utterances.

Such neo-Russellians claim that the truth or falsity of a belief attitude ascribing sentence involves more than just the agent of the report having among her beliefs the proposition expressed by the sentence embedded in the reporting sentence.

Perry argued against Frege's solution to Frege's puzzle by considering indexicals in propositional attitude reporting sentences.

In this discussion, we will examine attempts to deal with a puzzle about propositional attitude reporting sentences that was first posed by Gottlob Frege in his 1892.

This is because the de re and de dicto reporting sentences will report the very same belief, as is witnessed by the Naive Russellian view of the relationship between (11) and (13).

We typically make such reports by uttering propositional attitude reporting sentences like 'Jill believes that Jack broke his crown', employing a propositional attitude verb like 'believes, 'hopes', and 'knows', followed by a clause that includes a full sentence expressing a proposition (a that-clause).

So, even if one can give an adequate account of when two utterances samesay one another without presupposing a common meaning or proposition they are both related to, one's work in defending the paratactic account as an account of belief sentences (and other propositional attitude reporting sentences) is not complete.

But it is doubtful that there were at any time widespread uses of propositional attitude reporting sentences that met the necessary conditions for being conversational implicatures, as it is highly dubious that ordinary speakers ever realized that sentences like (1) and (4) say the same thing.

Like Crimmins and Perry, Richard offers a semantics of propositional attitude reporting sentences that treats them as context-sensitive, respects something like neo-Russellianism (although we'll return to this below), and yet blocks intersubstitution of co-referring names within the scope of propositional attitude verbs.

"What do we need four dozen doughnuts for?" was the last reported sentence Mel Lev uttered before eating four of them on the ride back.