Pohlhaus argues that feminist standpoint theory requires a social conception of the knower(s)—the knower should be conceived of as a knowledge community not an individual.
Our methods (narrative approach, concept maps) and findings also move beyond these studies in that they demonstrate how expertise, experience and context are used as a tacit skill and a way of seeing the practice world [ 27, 28], i.e., how tacit knowledge functions for the knower.
Riggs says this is best explained by the hypothesis that knowledge is "an achievement for which the knower deserves credit" (Riggs 2009, 341).
Such an approach is found on the reactive problem-solver (RPS); that is, the problem raised by the questioner in the CoP has to "wait" for the "solution knower" to respond (or reply).
Of course, one need not agree with the specifics of Duran's analysis to appreciate the importance of naturalized epistemology's descriptive attention to context and concrete details: this descriptive attention allows gender into epistemology as facets of the knower and the context become relevant.
Beall suggests that the knower gives us some independent evidence for thinking Kp ∧ ¬Kp, for some p, that the full description of human knowledge has the interesting feature of being inconsistent.
Ironically, the mistakes they induce, such as projective error (mistaking qualities of the knower or relations of knower to known for intrinsic qualities of the object known) and partiality, are the very errors these conceptions of objectivity are supposed to avoid.
And ordinarily, deviant skeptical possibilities are not among the relevant alternatives that a knower needs to exclude.
Kant's "Copernican Revolution" was that things revolve around the knower, rather than the knower around things.
Return for a moment to our thought experiment where I telepathically know all your thoughts whether you like it or not From my perspective, the perspective of the knower — your existence as a distinct person would begin to shrink.
