The fact that relying on some consideration would undermine the possibility of reaching a decision is itself a consideration relevant to deliberation; if one has good reason to reach a decision, and relying on some consideration precludes one from reaching a decision, that very fact constitutes a reason relevant to one's deliberation.
Thus they winnow down to manageable size the number of considerations relevant to deliberation, and help to provide, in any particular situation, the indispensable framework without which the question of rationality could not even be considered.
In the spirit of G. E. Moore, we might understand the evaluative reflection relevant to deliberation in consequentialist terms, as reflection about a non-natural property of goodness that is instantiated by states of the world; but this is not a very popular approach today.
The pressing need to engage with these kinds of question is highlighted by increasing calls for more public engagement in policy relevant ethical deliberation.
According to Buchanan and Miller (2006), "Taking a public health perspective on research ethics is associated with broadening the conceptualisation of risk and benefits deemed ethically relevant in deliberations on health research.
Deliberation makes a difference.
Due to their rigorous methodologies and systematic analyses of various policy aspects, the sciences as one societal subsystem can and should provide knowledge relevant for policy deliberation.
One answer is that the participatory process through which a community becomes an active agent on an issue requires members' access to relevant information, their deliberation, decision, privacy, commitment to the decision and time.
One issue raised in the above remarks is relevant to practical deliberation in general.
An advantage of contractualism is that it can capture the wide range of considerations that are relevant to moral deliberation.
There are at least three aspects of practical reason relevant to democratic deliberation: pragmatic, ethical, and moral uses of reason are employed with different objects (pragmatic ends, the interpretation of common values, and the just resolution of conflicts) and thus also different forms of validity (Habermas 1993, 1 18).
