However, this answer so far is inadequate: not just any historical relationship involving emotional interdependence is a loving relationship, and we need a principled way of distinguishing loving relationships from other relational evaluative attitudes: precisely what is the characteristic narrative history that is characteristic of love?
Rorty (1986/1993) does not try to present a complete account of love; rather, she focuses on the idea that "relational psychological attitudes" which, like love, essentially involve emotional and desiderative responses, exhibit historicity: "they arise from, and are shaped by, dynamic interactions between a subject and an object" (p. 73).
How can one reconcile the local and the relational characters of propositional attitudes?
Despite the changes in many of his positions over the years, the idea that intentional attitudes are relational has remained unchanged from its original formulation up to.
The empathy consists of an attitude of relational opening and not of the expression of our own emotions.
Empathy consists of an attitude of relational openness and not the expression of one's own emotions.
However, McLeod's and Benson's positions are constitutively relational because the self-regarding attitudes necessary for autonomy are themselves understood as constitutively relational.
Some philosophers take attitudes to be relational in another way as well, namely that attitude contents depend on relations to the environment: e.g., one cannot desire water unless H2O is (or was) present in one's environment.
Included among the measures to assess this construct are the child's report of their Attitudes Toward Violence and Relational Aggression, parent STAXI and CTS1, as well as indices of violence from the neighborhood assessment, NIfETy.
This study extends this stream of research by investigating relational effects of RPI that capture RPI recipients' attitudes towards RPI provision.
