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One strategy is to reject premise (1) and the standard criterion of ontological commitment discussed above.
So if we want to reject the conclusion, we must reject Premise (1).
This position has indeed been the view of the internalists who reject premise (3) but accept premises (1) and (2).
First, a skeptic might well reject Premise (1) on the ground of a general skepticism about memory (Allison 1983: 306 7).
A simple solution to the puzzle is to reject premise 2. Each of the relevant fusions of water droplets looks and acts like a cloud, so it is a cloud.
In light of this distinction, it may seem that to reject premise (3) for the reasons given is to suppose that moral judgments necessarily have both directions of fit simultaneously.
Similar(52)
Responses of this sort reject premises P1 or P2 or their analogues.
Responses of this sort reject premises like P3 or P4 and, in doing so, take sides on a key issue in modal epistemology.
This solution rejects premise (2) of the basic argument in its full generality.
Some have rejected premise 2, aligning themselves with versions of moral constructivism or rationalism (e.g. Darwall 1983; Scanlon 1998).
Chatton also finesses premise (2), but he bluntly rejects premise (1) by asserting the astonishing claim that finite continua are composed of finitely many indivisibles.
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Since I tried Ludwig back in 2017, I have been constantly using it in both editing and translation. Ever since, I suggest it to my translators at ProSciEditing.

Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
CEO of Professional Science Editing for Scientists @ prosciediting.com