Following this line of thought through, we appear to reach the conclusion that nothing short of full-blown entities like the fact that Socrates is wise will be competent to make the sentence "Socrates is wise", or the Thought or proposition expressed by that sentence, true.[10] The question now is: can we regard such entities as truth-makers for corresponding sentences, Thoughts, or propositions?
So a Fregean identity theory of truth would regard both such entities as that Socrates is wise and, correlatively, facts as sense-level entities: this kind of identity theory will then state that true such entities are identical with facts.
Israel regards such criticism as politically motivated.
This is because it has long been recognised that legal systems can regard as legal persons such entities as they please.
We report here Dragon Database for Exploration of Sodium Channels in Human (DDESC), which provides comprehensive information related to sodium channels regarding different entities, such as "genes and proteins", "metabolites and enzymes", "toxins", "chemicals with pharmacological effects", "disease concepts", "human anatomy", "pathways and pathway reactions" and their potential links.
Such entities are often regarded as too absurd to take seriously as components of reality.
To say that such entities exist though there is no means of knowing them is regarded as absurd, for no unverifiable assertion of existence is meaningful.
Debates regarding the nature of simple entities, their interrelations or dependencies between one another, and whether there are any such entities, are still alive and well.
Exploiting the eeriness of such entities is a defining practice of so-called "postmodern" artists, who tend to hold Rosenquist in high regard.
All state funds will then be divested from such entities.
It also terminates state contracts with such entities.
