She really has one of the most reductive minds in punditry.
Thomas Polger (2004) handles multiple realizability by developing a "non-reductive mind-brain identity theory".
Functionalism, along with any non-reductive theory of mind, faces the problem just discussed.
All reductionist doctrines give rise to this suspicion, as is evidenced by the ongoing debate about the place of the mind in reductive materialism.
Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind.
The essential question to be answered by an elaborated identity theory is, in Feigl's view, the following: "[H]ow are the raw feels related to behavioral (or neurophysiological) states?" (1967, p. 5) By posing the question that way, Feigl excludes a reductive solution to the mind-body problem.
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.
On Berkeley's reductive view everything real reduces to minds and ideas.
Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.
Ever since Nagel's 1974 article, "What Is It Like to be a Bat?", the notion of what-it-is-like to experience a mental state or activity has posed a challenge to reductive materialism and functionalism in theory of mind.
The assumption that multiple realizability "seals the deal" against reductive physicalism and the type identity theory of mind was misplaced initially, and is now even more misplaced after the second wave of recent criticisms.
