This sounds pretty plausible, but it turns out that it's rather difficult to reduce facts about motion, for example, to suitable moment-by-moment facts.
To analyse the role of FACT-L in sexual-stage parasites we developed a 'promoter-swap' approach to completely eliminate or significantly reduce fact-l transcription in gametocytes.
Thus construed, positivism, for example, would seek to explain the nature of law by reducing facts about what the law is, how it functions and what it requires, to more foundational social facts e.g., about people's behavior, beliefs and dispositions.
Almost-Lewis's theses about what fundamental ontology comprises, and how all other facts reduce to facts about it, bears a very close relationship to Lewis's celebrated thesis of Humean Supervenience (hereafter: "HS").
Begin with a purely conceptual point: we would like our understanding of "reduce to" to be such that it is a purely logical or analytical consequence of, for example, the claim that facts about tables reduce to facts about spacetime points, that facts about spacetime points do not reduce to facts about tables.
According to the constructive interpretation view, the aim of a first-order theory of law is not to analyze any concept or to reduce legal facts to other more foundational facts.
But since space is an abstraction from objects, answers to any riddles about space reduce to facts about objects.
However, they do not allow quantum mechanics to "approximately reduce" chemical facts, because the errors introduced by these approximations cannot be estimated (Scerri, 1991, 1994).
But if we say that modal facts reduce to non-modal facts, then we cannot mean merely that modal facts supervene on non-modal facts more "natural" than those modal facts.
So the Republicans screaming about the evils of deficits would not, in fact, reduce the deficit — and, in fact, would do the opposite.
