But the being something has by virtue of numerical identity is "greater" than the being it has by reason of something it shares with another.
As Scotus puts it: "if an entity is finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something accidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic degree of finite or infinite perfection" (Ordinatio 1, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1 2, n. 142).
He could be really revved up about southern succession for reasons of something else.
For me to do anything else for the sole reason of doing something different would be so contrived.
Fundamentalist Christians alone maintain this odd position of the Bible's literal inerrancy, explicable only through faith, through the submission of reason to something deeper or higher or more complete than sense.
Well in short, lots—I learned that I'm terrible under pressure, I learned that a constant inhaling of 0.7 mls of nicotine in the space of three hours will give me the shakes, and I learned that saying 'no' to teenagers is enough of a reason for something to become the height of cool.
One way of making the separateness of these two distinctions especially vivid is to note that someone might embrace the former distinction and admit that there are both kinds of reasons, but reject the very notion of a "reason for something to happen" as resting on an obscure, confused notion of a reason that can float free of all possible agents.
Rather, it is simply to note that it is not obviously misguided to reject the very concept of a reason for something to happen, and we should leave room for someone to do this without supposing all reasons for acting are agent-relative, for that is simply another question.
As Jonathan Swift was right to say, you can't reason people out of something they weren't reasoned into.
Mr. LaBute, who has a long and controversial history of writing boorish male characters for movies like "In the Company of Men" and plays like "Bash," said Mr. Sadoski had inspired him to change the original, darker ending of "reasons" to something more bittersweet.
It is, at least originally, sentiment that discerns it although Hume's arguments leave it open that discovering by reason the tendency of something to give rise to sentiment could be a source of moral knowledge (Sturgeon 2001).
