While Kumārila's epistemology may, then, by itself show that Vedic texts are justifiably credited as epistemically reliable (that, in other words, Mīmāṃsaka beliefs are rationally held), it is logically independent claims about the eternality of the Vedas that are taken by Mīmāṃsakas to warrant the stronger conclusion that Vedic injunctions are uniquely so.
Together with a robust realism about linguistic universals and the peculiarly Mīmāṃsaka conviction that the Vedic texts are eternal, this epistemology was effectively deployed by Kumārila to show that a commitment to the uniquely authoritative status of the Vedas (and to the ritual practices enjoined thereby) was rationally held.
The problem of the relational nature of the contents of true singular thoughts can be made more acute by the following puzzle that exercised Gottlob Frege (1892): how can one rationally hold two distinct singular beliefs that are both about one and the same object?
Since evidentialism might otherwise seem to give rise to a regress problem, it is generally conjoined with some version of foundationalism which purports to delineate a criterion of "proper basicality"—i.e., a set of conditions under which beliefs can rationally be held without further evidential support.
Voters know the party is not vying for government and, quite rationally, they hold it to a lower standard.
Illusions are not held rationally.
There is no universally accepted definition of administrative law, but rationally it may be held to cover the organization, powers, duties, and functions of public authorities of all kinds engaged in administration; their relations with one another and with citizens and nongovernmental bodies; legal methods of controlling public administration; and the rights and liabilities of officials.
A big week for podcasts: at Rationally Speaking, Jesse Prinz holds forth on what might be "beyond" human nature; the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research has a discussion with philosopher of science David Albert; and at the Habermas-Rawls blog, a collection of eight lectures on the work of Charles Taylor.
Reason is not confined, in his view, to the same limits as knowledge, and we are rationally required to hold beliefs about things as they are in themselves, not merely things as they appear to us.
A more persuasive worry about dialetheism, relating to rationality, is the claim that if a person could legitimately accept a contradiction, then no one could be forced, rationally, to abandon a view held.
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, moreover, came into close contact with Hellenistic culture, which held up the ideal of rationally certified knowledge as the basis for the good life.
