In this vein, Wedgwood argues more generally that it is only "rational" dispositions that determine intentional content (where rationality is taken to be a normative property; cf. Wedgwood 2007, 167ff; 2009).
Both the empiricist and the rationalist versions of generalized 2D semantics assign 1-intensions to words in such a way as to reflect individual speakers' current rational dispositions: 1-intensions are therefore fully determined by the speaker's current internal states.
It is the task of psychological intervention, Jaspers thus argued, to guide human existence beyond the restricted antinomies around which it stabilizes itself, and to allow it decisively to confront the more authentic possibilities, of subjective and objective life, which it effaces through its normal rational dispositions and attitudes.
(Bill Clinton?) The "No Drama Obama" meme (I promise never to use this word again) owes its origins to this sense for the president's sometimes overly-rational disposition.
For as Thomas says, the rational virtues "are dispositions by which man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature by which he is a man.
Velleman has expressed reservations about identifying the constitutive aim of rational agency with the disposition to govern one's own behavior.
His point is that, while there is nothing rational about a fixed disposition to risk aversion, it is nonetheless rational in some circumstances to choose conservatively to protect certain fundamental interests against loss or compromise.
Rational affective reactions and dispositions replace emotion.
In the book Gauthier assumes that if our dispositions to choose is rational, then our choices determined by these dispositions are also rational.
Even if a disposition to be instrumentally rational is indispensable in the way Dreier suggests to having a practical reason, nothing follows about what one has practical reason to do.
It may conclude that cultivating a disposition to one-box is rational although one-boxing itself is irrational.
