Sentence examples for rational degree from inspiring English sources

A new PQI model was developed using the optimum predicted long-term performance with the application of the grey rational degree theory.

Intuitively, the probability of a sentence S, P[S] = r, says that S is plausible to degree r, or that the rational degree of confidence (or belief) that S is true is r.

To the best of my knowledge nobody has yet published an argument for the thesis that degrees of belief should be plausibility or possibility measures, respectively (in the sense that all and only plausibility respectively possibility measures are rational degree of belief functions).

They are rational degrees of belief and rational degrees of desire, respectively.

In epistemological terms, this Simple Principle of Conditionalization requires that the effects of evidence on rational degrees be analyzed in two stages: The first is non-inferential.

Both de Finetti (1972) and Savage (1954) argued that the principle should not be invoked as a constraint on rational degrees of belief.

Because there is no generally agreed upon solution to the Problem of the Priors, it is an open question whether Bayesian Confirmation Theory has inductive content, or whether it merely translates the framework for rational belief provided by deductive logic into a corresponding framework for rational degrees of belief.

Finally, the idea of analyzing rational degrees of belief in terms of rational betting behavior led to the 20th century development of a new kind of decision theory, Bayesian decision theory, which is now the dominant theoretical model for the both the descriptive and normative analysis of decisions.

Williamson extends de Finetti's Dutch Book Argument for a finite additivity constraint on rational degrees of belief to produce an argument for a countable additivity constraint on degrees of belief, but the argument is better interpreted as a reductio of the literal-minded interpretation of Dutch Book Arguments than as an argument for the rationality of a countable additivity constraint.

The formal apparatus itself has two main elements: the use of the laws of probability as coherence constraints on rational degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) and the introduction of a rule of probabilistic inference, a rule or principle of conditionalization.

For now, however, let us waive these concerns, and turn to an important argument, again originating with Ramsey, that uses the betting analysis purportedly to show that rational degrees of belief must conform to the probability calculus (with at least finite additivity).