The phrase "rational commitment" is grammatically correct and can be used in written English.
It refers to making a logical or reasonable decision to commit to something. Example: "I have a rational commitment to my health, so I exercise and eat healthy foods every day."
For the Kantian ethical subject, emotional and social bonds imperil objectivity and undermine rational commitment to duty.
That is to say, given that we have certain beliefs, do these beliefs already bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to such questions as 'Are there numbers?' If our beliefs bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to an ontological question about the existence of certain entities then we can say that we are committed to the existence of these entities.
These differences in use should not be confused with the three types of taking-for-true or Fürwahrhalten, i.e., the propositional attitudes of opining, epistemic belief, and certainty, which are merely the three basic "stages" (Stufen) of increasing rational commitment to the truth (A820 823/B848 851).
Second, the epistemic 2D framework establishes a Carnapian connection between meaning and possibility by using the space of possible scenarios to systematically map these rational commitments.
Fist, epistemic 1-intensions establish a Fregean connection between meaning and apriority by isolating an aspect of naïve linguistic understanding that reflects the subject's own rational commitments about the truth- and applicability-conditions of her words.
Using this space of scenarios, we can then assign 1-intensions to the subject's expressions that reflect her own ideal rational commitments about how to identify familiar objects, kinds, and properties on the basis of empirical suppositions about her actual environment.
But "there are few coherent approaches being used to join these two systems into a rational shared commitment to the Common Core," the report found.
Ferré considers theism "optional" in the sense that the premises of theistic arguments are subject to competing and equally rational value commitments (Ferré 2001, 177f).
As one 18th-century British consumer, Lady Caroline Lennox, put it, shopping was more than just instant gratification: it was a "rational exercise, a commitment to the civilizing powers of trade".
Without these commitments, rational suppliers will continue to demand high spot prices.
Should every rational agent whose commitments for change are constrained at least by the basic postulates of AGM accept every non-iterated instance of ((a ∧ b) → (a > b))?
