In fact, the conception of agency that we draw on is compatible with recognizing that the vast majority of biological agents are not psychological agents at all.
Music's emotional expressivity is a philosophical problem since the paradigm expressers of emotions are psychological agents, who have emotions to express.
Those who reject teleomentalism typically seek naturalistic truth conditions for teleological claims in biology that do not refer to the intentions, goals, or purposes of psychological agents.
Neither pieces of music, nor performances of them, are psychological agents, thus it is puzzling that such things could be said to express emotions.
This reflects Kennedy's worry when he claims that the following argument for attributing mental properties to animals rests on a false dichotomy: either animals are stimulus-response machines, or they are agents with beliefs and desires; since animals are not stimulus-response machines, they must be psychological agents (Kennedy 1992).
Moreover, psychological aspects of agent design, such as gender, pedagogical roles (e.g., companion vs. mentor), visual style (e.g., realism vs. baby-faced design), stereotypes, and similarity-attraction, can potentially affect a learner's emotional state, which in turn, may impact affective and motivational aspects of learning.
In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with psychological and epistemological principles regarding agent-identification, the theory can generate novel hypotheses regarding the distinction between recognition-based, heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent-identification.
In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with psychological and epistemological hypotheses about agent-identification, the theory can generate novel predictions regarding the distinction between recognition-based, heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent-identification. Let us first analyse a series of influential works that adopt the universalist approach.
This account of local autonomy is constitutively relational because no matter how robust an agents' psychological capacities, if the relevant external conditions do not obtain at a time, it is not possible for the agent's preference at that time to be autonomous.
The three major domains we will study include the qualitative 3D geometry of the scene, the underlying physics and the domain of psychological knowledge, about agents, their beliefs, goals, and interactions.
