In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano said that every psychical phenomenon is characterized by "intentional inexistence".
Here, the FE model supports the comprehension of a psychical phenomenon that is experimentally measured but poorly understood by the only means of experiments.
"When an object attracting the dog's attention at a distance brings about secretion of saliva, it is fully justified, of course, to assume that this is a psychical phenomenon and not a physiological one".
Judgments are psychical phenomena and they belong therefore not to World 3 but to our real world.
A member of the Metaphysical Society, he was also interested in psychical phenomena and was a founder and first president of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882.
Concerned with mental processes, or acts, he revived and modernized the scholastic philosophical theory of "intentional existence," or, as he called it, "immanent objectivity"; in psychical phenomena, he held, there is a "direction of the mind to an object" (e.g., one sees something).
He went on to say that this intentional inexistence is "exclusively peculiar to psychical phenomena.
While Brentano seems to think that his inclusion of feeling and desire in a single class of psychical phenomena is supported by inner perception, Ehrenfels points out how ineffective an appeal to inner perception is in such matters of dispute (this, however, does not prevent Ehrenfels from making similar appeals at crucial junctures of his value theory).
The realm of reality includes everything in space and time and herewith all material objects and events of the physical world (i.e., Popper's World 1) as well as all mental (or "psychical") phenomena of our inner world (i.e., World 2).
He found that most James scholars have been reluctant even to address James' active and lasting involvement in psychical research and his conviction of the reality of certain psychic phenomena, let alone discuss the importance of his unorthodox interests for an understanding of his psychological and philosophical writings.
Selectively quoting from James' last public statement on psychical research (James, 1909a), where James admitted his inability to account for psychic phenomena with a specific theory, Boring sweepingly disqualified any belief in psychic phenomena by reference to the ubiquitous 'need to believe' theory.
