In other words, he might be able to appeal to the conjunction of some other basic propositions and/or non-basic propositions that provide a reason for thinking that b is true.
If there are independent moral truths, then we may plausibly have grasped many of them through autonomous exercises of our capacities for moral reflection, whereby we have come to recognize good reasons for thinking certain moral propositions to be true, by correctly grasping that certain features of actions are wrong-making, say.
The question is, then: what reason, if any, can Metochites have for thinking that the proposition that self-movement is eternal follows from (an argument containing) the proposition that self-movement does not exist?
The question to Fred can be put this way: On the assumption that you cannot appeal to any other proposition, do you have any reason for thinking that b is true?
If we adopt these definitions, belief is the general term for thinking that a proposition (such as evolution) is true, with acceptance being a more restricted subset (Fig. 1).
"One might be forgiven for thinking that both such propositions are as confounding as they are unprecedented.
There does not seem to be any independent motivation for thinking the content of the proposition has changed.
Of course, foundationalists typically realize this and, in order to avoid arbitrariness, tell some story (for example, about privileged access) that provides a reason for thinking what Fred has called basic propositions are at least somewhat likely to be true.
For he has this reason for thinking that b is true: b has autonomous warrant and propositions with autonomous warrant are somewhat likely to be true.
Now, Fred could respond by giving some reason for thinking that b is true even if b is basic, because basic propositions could have some non-autonomous warrant that depends upon the warrant of other propositions.
