The main disputes in the literature about the definition of omniscience have focused on the scope of the quantifier in (D1), whether, for example, it includes propositions about the future, whether (D1) requires an omniscient being to change as time goes by, whether it requires enough for maximal knowledge, and whether it (falsely) presupposes that there is a set of all truths.
According to Kant, theoretical judgments are judgments used such that their overall rational purpose or function is to be true propositions about the world, whether that world is taken to be phenomenal or noumenal (20: 195).
For, just because it is restricted to certain meta-linguistic claims, EC has only limited significance for skepticism: from the fact that, in non-skeptical contexts, we can use 'S knows that p' to express propositions which are true, nothing follows about whether we know anything a question which we can and do wonder about in philosophical contexts.
Holkot argued, the possibility of a counterfactual past differentiated propositions about the future on contingent matters and their equivalents--whether set in the past or present--from propositions about the past and present that are not about such contingent matters.
Unlike propositions about relations of ideas, propositions about matters of fact are known only through experience.
For Locke, propositions about ideas are themselves mere mental propositions.
(Even the correspondence theorist holds that propositions about propositions have propositions as their truth conditions).
Propositions about current human interactions: Propositions concerning parenting and childbirth.
They are not propositions about relations of ideas because they are not self- evidently true analytical propositions.
Their plight is worsened by the fact that arbitrarily chosen sets of propositions can include propositions about what is believed.
