Although this idea has sometimes been advanced as an alternative to LOT, it has remained more like a metaphor, never developed in a sufficiently detailed way as to allow for serious comparison and critical evaluation, partly because of similar problems that plague imagistic or pictorial representational systems as the main representational media underlying propositional thinking.
At Becker, we are reconceiving our general education curriculum to concentrate on developing tools to navigate ambiguity, divergent and propositional thinking and social and emotional intelligence.
But it is committed to the claim that propositional thought and thinking cannot be successfully accounted for in its entirety in purely imagistic terms.
Higher cognition (specifically, thought and thinking with propositional content) conceived in this way, has certain empirically interesting properties: in particular, it is a law of nature that cognitive capacities are productive, systematic, and inferentially coherent.
Theorists of nonconceptual content have canvassed several types of reasons for thinking that this propositional content does not exhaust the representational content of perception (see the entry on the contents of perception).[6] First, it has been argued that the contents of perception exhibit certain features that cannot be exhibited by the contents of the propositional attitudes.
It is not meant to be taken as an analysis of what the folk mean (or, for that matter, what the scientists ought to mean) when they talk about various propositional attitudes and their role in thinking.
Goldfarb thinks that the logical theory of Principia is motivated by Russell's attempt to find the real nature of propositional functions and that this nature is independent of our thinking about it.
Talk of referents and propositional contents and logical forms belongs to a formalistic picture of what thinking is like, a picture which is at best an intermittently convenient fiction.
So provided that we are consistent in our comparisons of objectual and propositional understanding on the one hand, and objectual and propositional knowledge on the other, Kvanvig fails to make a sound case for thinking that understanding is of greater value than knowledge.
Yet no one would suggest that the computer is actually thinking or believing somewhere inside its circuits the equivalent of the propositional attitude "I believe I can kick this guy's butt" in Mentalese.
If we let 'A' stand for such attitude verbs as 'believe'desireire'hopeope'intend'nd'think'nk', etc., then the propositional attitude statements all have the form: S As that P. Representational Theory of Thinking: Mental processes, thinking in particular, consists of causal sequences of tokenings of mental representations.
