Sentence examples for proposition or state from inspiring English sources

There sees to be widespread agreement among analytic philosophers that belief is (roughly) a dispositional affirmative attitude towards a proposition (or state of affairs).

On the other use, it relates us to a Russellian proposition or state of affairs, something that has individuals, properties, relations, etc., as constituents.

If intending is being on the way to intentional action, it is no surprise that its proper object what one is on the way to doing is not a mere proposition or state of affairs, but something one can do.

Recall that one, the phrastic, represents a proposition or state of affairs, and the other, the neustic, functions as something like a force indicator, insofar as the neustic indicates what speech-act is being performed with the phrastic.

First, as we have seen, the nonpropositional view says that for Hume a moral evaluation does not express any proposition or state any fact; either it gives vent to a feeling, or it is itself a feeling (Flew, Blackburn, Snare, Bricke).

For instance, if intention is a representation that is such as to guide and control what it represents, its object must be as such as to be guided: it must be the sort of thing that can be in progress and move towards completion, something that can be done, not a mere proposition or state of affairs.

An optimal policy can be found using existing methods, but these methods require time at best polynomial in the number of states in the domain, where the number of states is exponential in the number of propositions (or state variables).

According to many philosophers, it is to propositions, or states of affairs.

Someone who holds that reasons are true propositions or states of affairs and who also holds that there are no irreducibly indexical propositions or states of affairs (only indexical 'modes of presentation' of such propositions or states of affairs) will have trouble making use of the reason-statement version of the distinction for just this reason.

For Diodorus and Philo, as for the Stoics the modalities were primarily considered as properties of propositions or states of affairs.

The ontological status of non-actual worlds is far from obvious: they may be taken to be concrete objects (structured sets of physical objects) or abstract objects (sets of sentences, propositions, or states of affairs).