From this it follows that all other apparent propositions are pseudo-propositions of various types and that all other uses of 'true' and 'truth' deviate markedly from the truth-by-correspondence (or agreement) that contingent propositions have in relation to reality.
This led to proposition of several hypotheses.
Biology has seen the proposition of several species concepts.
The result is that we have a hierarchy of propositions and of concepts of various orders.
Because any statement apparently about a class of individuals involves this sort of higher-order quantification, the truth or falsity of such a proposition will ultimately depend on the truth or falsity of various elementary propositions about its members.
Yet it develops a kind of logic — a theory of meaning (today we say logical semantics) — in that it describes and analyzes objective contents of consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions, in short, ideal meanings of various types that serve as intentional contents, or noematic meanings, of various types of experience.
In the interests of space, I've recast just one of the most critical parts of Dreher's argument into the form of various ethical propositions.
It does not follow that all explicit philosophical reasoning can be properly represented as beginning with propositions stating that we have intuitions of various sorts (that route is self-defeating and incapable of accounting for justification by reasoning).
The proofs of various parts of this Proposition can be found e.g. in [15, 16, 20, 67, 75, 76, 78].
For example, Mitrović [13, 14] published some applications of Proposition 4.3 to various problems in G-convex spaces as follows.
