With the perceptual cognition, "That's a pot," for instance, the pot as an individual in connection with a sensory faculty is responsible for the awareness of a property-bearer, for what is called the qualificandum portion of the perception, without admixture of memory.
But with late Nyāya Schayer's argument form of UI and MP misleads for yet another reason, namely, failing to be sufficiently sensitive to the logic of occurrence and non-occurrence of properties at a location, or qualifying a property-bearer, as Staal (1973) and others have brought out.
Of course, there is an extremely wide range of views about properties and property-bearers (see the entry on properties), so claiming that modes are akin to properties that inhere in substances will not answer all questions.
If so then at least one concrete object is required, by the argument that properties need bearers; and at most one concrete object is required, by the argument from exclusion discussed above.
This view is most closely associated with Lewis (1979) and Chisholm (1981), who took the objects of propositional attitudes to be properties which the bearer of the attitude ascribes to him- or herself.
Edwards' model is not a whole and its parts, or a substance (a bearer of properties) and its properties, or an essence and its accidents, but agent causality.
Presumably you are a substance (see the entry on substance), a bearer of properties, not a substance only when it has certain properties.
a particular class of phenes P is defined with respect to a defining property Y of its bearers.
A different way to make a similar point is that biological entities and processes (including molecular ones) often possess their causal properties extrinsically (i.e., due to features external to the bearer of the property).
A thing's essential properties are inseparable from the bearer, not only in the sense that the property is necessarily had by that object but in the deeper sense that any adequate account of what that object is involves that property; they are part of any adequate definition of the thing or answer to the question 'What is it?'.
In MMK 18 2a the opponent wonders: 'if there was no self, where would the self's properties come from?' The worry behind this question is that the undeniable fact that there are properties of the self since the Madhyamaka does not want to deny that seeing, feeling, tasting and so forth takes place — implies that there must be a bearer of such properties, i.e. a self.
