Aristotle, according to Avempace, classified the science of animals into four sections: 1) properties of the sensible parts of animals, 2) properties of their limbs, 3) properties of their homogeneous sensible parts, and 4) properties of their non-homogeneous sensible parts (Ibn Bâjja 2002a, Ḥayawân, p. 76).
(A VI vi 296/RB 296) It would seem, then, that Leibniz has something like the following in mind: experience informs us of a certain consistent set of sensible properties in, for example, gold; that is, a certain set of properties is compossible.
In the current manifest image, this is how we think of sensible properties, according to Sellars.
An account of sensible properties calls for a preliminary account of sensation (including pleasure and pain), and it is with that preliminary account that this section of the discourse concludes.
One consequence of this usage is that, in Locke's epistemology, words designating the sensible properties of objects are systematically ambiguous.
Now according to Wolff all sensible properties of bodies should be considered as secondary (or mind-dependent) qualities.
The same holds true for other characteristic properties of a substance, the sensible qualities: they are not distinct from their substance.
But, at least in standard exteroception, these qualities contingently represent objective sensible properties of public objects in virtue of either resembling them or by being regularly caused by their instantiations — or both.
With the properties of, there is a sensible reason to design the projection matrix in a way that minimizes the mutual coherence which may lead to better performance of reconstruction algorithms.
If forms were merely posited to explain the compresence of contrary properties in sensible things, then there would be no need to posit a form corresponding to properties (such as water and dirt) that have no contraries.
