Sentence examples for properties of experience from inspiring English sources
The above definitional criteria all relate to properties of experience; that is, they are psychological.
These philosophers deny representationalism, and identify qualia in the broad sense with intrinsic nonrepresentational properties of experience.
As noted in section 1, the term 'qualia' is sometimes used for intrinsic nonrepresentational, consciously accessible properties of experience.
However, some philosophers hold that there are qualia in the sense of intrinsic nonrepresentational properties of experience.
And likewise they can explain the conceivability of zombies without becoming committed to the existence of any non-physical properties of experience (contra Chalmers 1996).
In addition, Rowlands (2001) and Jehle and Kriegel (2006) have objected that dispositional HOT theory can't explain the sense in which the phenomenal properties of experience are categorical.
The answer (Smart 1959) is that the properties of experiences are 'topic neutral'.
On this view, whether qualia are properties of experiences (in particular, intrinsic, non-intentional properties) is a theoretical matter.
Qualia (singular 'quale'), in a common modern usage, are properties of experiences that type them in phenomenological respects.
For the phenomenalist, it is the phenomenal properties of experiences — qualia themselves — that constitute the fundamental difference between experience and thought.
As noted above, the second pillar in the foundation of the view that qualia are intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of experiences is the common kind assumption.
