Hermeneutic fictionalism presents problems for the justification of premise (1).
Coming back to the main problem of the dependence of the justification of transformation of oxygenates on variable conditions, a new attitude regarding the products of the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis should be noted.
On the Rawlsian view, however, the problem of legitimacy is cast in terms of the justification of coercion not of authority.
It is worth mentioning that the decision – making process is not always strictly designed under the objective of concluding to a definite solution; sometimes it is intended to conclude in the thorough understanding of a problem, the justification of different options and the exchange of opinions among the multiple actors involved.
Some unsolved problems concerning the justification of chaos control methods are presented.
Supererogation raises interesting problems both on the meta-ethical level of deontic logic and on the normative level of the justification of moral demands.
Central to these is the problem of induction, which concerns the justification of inferences or procedures that extrapolate from data to predictions and general facts.
Mythological views of providence, destiny, or fate are given precise shades of meaning vis-à-vis dominant views in a tradition concerning justice and divine law, the philosophical problem of determinism, the theological problems of theodicy (justification of a good god with observable facts of evil), and predestination.
Others may well adapt their own preferred response to the Humean problem of induction, or simply deny that the justification of the PP matters as much to the theory of objective chance as its truth and its truth will do to secure the frequency-chance connection needed here.
Philosophers of science have addressed general methodological problems, such as the nature of scientific explanation and the justification of induction.
