There's relatively little written about the much more interesting problem of good.
Miciński's passionate metaphysical concerns led him to an obsessive concentration on the problem of good and evil.
Having entered prison as an atheist with a moral-relativist bent, Genis next took up the problem of good and evil, scouring Pascal, Rousseau, Schopenhauer, "Crime and Punishment," and Knut Hamsun's "Hunger".
Can understanding its situation in the brain's neural mechanisms help solve or dissolve the Problem of Good?
Perhaps an intentionalist account of the constitution of pleasure's experienced value (to which Schroeder is sympathetic but in his 2004 uncommitted) along such lines will solve or dissolve the Problem of Good.
The ubiquitous problem of good spectrum estimation has been researched for many years, and in their seminal 1958 book Blackman and Tukey describe a 'pilot spectrum,' a 'simple and cheap preliminary estimate' of the spectral density function.
Is evil-doing … possible in default of not just 'base motives'... but of any motives whatever … Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be connected with our faculty of thought?" (LM, vol. I, 4 5).
This Problem of Good was, in the past century, raised specifically against views akin to the simple picture of pleasure, on which pleasure is valuable by virtue of its intrinsic nature, perhaps just because of the way it feels in its moment, and independently of our or other animals' actually desiring or pursuing it.
While ancients and medievals inhabiting a teleological worldview (on which attraction toward the good required no further explanation) could answer thus, to that extent, it seems, they faced no Problem of Good, which arises to the extent one abandons unexplained teleology.
Playing the piano to save your skin is something quite different from playing to caress your narcissism and go beyond the petit-bourgeois problem of good taste in art.
