To maintain the probability of key connection, previous approaches [6, 22, 23] need more nodes in the environment, meaning that more keys are stored in the sensor nodes.
The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme has reduced probability of key compromise, communication overhead and storage overhead as compared to other schemes.
The scheme improves resilience because the probability that a link is compromised, when a sensor node is captured, decreases, but probability of key sharing also decreases because a pair of nodes has to share keys instead of one.
These limitations have given rise to end-to-end, predictive approaches, such as Predictive State Representations (PSRs) and our Stochastic Distinguishing Experiments (SDEs), that learn a representation of state encoded in the probabilities of key sequences of raw actions and observations (i.e., experiments the agent can perform).
Those in the predominantly PGD class evidenced high probabilities of key PGD symptoms including longing/yearning for the deceased, difficulty accepting the death, and bitterness.
Thus, preserving the degree of tags' privacy in keeping with fast authentication speed is equivalent to reducing the correlation probability of group keys.
Additionally the dynamic update of the key can lower the probability of the key to being guessed correctly.
A hash chain based on maximum value of attack coefficient along with the multiple key pools is used to reduce the probability of the key compromise and communication overhead of the proposed scheme.
Now we discuss how the sensor nodes compromise affects the secure communication link between two noncompromised ordinary nodes, that is, the probability of pairwise key between two noncompromised ordinary nodes being compromised when there are a fraction of compromised sensor nodes.
