Therefore, in each stable equilibrium, the probability of cooperation, which we call the cooperativeness, toward ingroup and outgroup recipients is given by p in ∗ (G ) and p out ∗ (G ), respectively.
In contrast, as ⟨ k⟩ increases, the fixation probability of cooperation decreases [ 31], because the chance for the emergence of cooperator clusters decreases.
The literature about the probability of cooperation in surveys with migrants is based on the social isolation hypothesis (e.g., Font and Méndez 2013; Helmschrott and Martin 2014).
Using survey data of manufacturing enterprises in Guangdong province of China, the paper shows that the probability of cooperation with university significantly depends on various organizational factors including firm size and enterprise absorptive capacity.
Agent (iin A) has three learning parameters: the probability of cooperation (i.e. posting a new article) (B_i), the probability of giving rewards (e.g. posting a comment on the article) to reciprocal agents (L_{C_i}), and the probability of giving rewards to other (normal) agents (L_{N_i}).
To test whether the probability of cooperation after each outcome was different from chance, i.e. 0.5, we performed G-tests.
To model the observed behaviour we used the probability of cooperation after each of the game's outcomes (T,R,P,S), averaged across the five rats that played TFT (P C0|T−1) = 0.73, P C0|R−1) = 0.42 P(C0|P−1) = 0.84, P C0|S−1) = 0.49).
We also find an optimal number of partners, for which the fixation probability of cooperation shows a maximum.
Preferential attachment increases the fixation probability of cooperation more if the relative benefit of cooperation (b/ c) is higher or when the mean connectivity ⟨ k⟩ is higher.
The agents have an inclination toward cooperation or competition, expressed as p the probability of cooperation of the agent with another agent.
