Sentence examples for principle of individuation from inspiring English sources

Moreover, Auriol states explicitly that there is no principle of individuation — individuals just are individuals and their individuality needs no further explanation.

Contrary to most philosophers before him, matter is not the principle of individuation and therefore individual identity and personhood can exist divorced from matter, and the soul is immaterial, as are the bodies of the afterlife (Mulla Sadra 2001-5, IX: 311).

This leads to a dilemma that was articulated by Steven French and Michael Redhead (1988); either quantum particles are not individuals, or they are individuals but the principle of individuation that applies to them must make reference to some kind of empirically transcendent haecceity, bare particularity or the like.

Before the human being comes onto the scene with its principle of sufficient reason (or principle of individuation) there are no individuals.

However, one singular entity in a species of several co-specific individuals has to contain both the principle of the specific unity of these individuals and its own principle of individuation.

The intellect is immaterial, according to Aquinas, and since he also famously thinks that matter is the principle of individuation, the intelligible species in the potential intellect is not individual, but universal.

Even spatial and temporal specifications (X as the object/event occupying location Z at time Y) fail as unambiguous principles of individuation; they would indeed be able to succesfully individuate particular objects/events within a given spatiotemporal series, yet they would not be able to differentiate one spatiotemporal series from another.

This review highlights how the philosophical notion of a 'sortal' – a concept that provides principles of individuation and principles of identity – has been introduced into cognitive developmental psychology.

Thus, Bradley argued against the view that space and time are "principles of individuation" by alleging that no specification of spatial or temporal position, whether in terms of here and now or by the use of spatial coordinates or dating systems, could achieve uniqueness.

Without more specificity about when principles of individuation are the same and different, the foundation of Wiggins' account is murky.

His final answer is that both matter and form are principles of individuation: matter as the passive cause (causa receptiva; he also calls it the causa sine qua non), form as the active cause (QLIIS 17, 64).