Impressed with the need for an interpretation of the concept of probability that was thoroughly empirical, Reichenbach elaborated a view that conceived probability as a limit of relative frequency and buttressed it with a pragmatic justification of inductive inference.
But, if his remedies were tactically impractical, in political philosophy he had gone very deep by providing the sovereign nation-state with a pragmatic justification and directing it to utilitarian ends.
The belief here is that, unlike with other cuts, no pragmatic justification is required: a hard-grafting majority are angry with a workshy minority, and want retrenchment on principle.
The same pragmatic justification may apply to the many intellectuals I know who, despite the exertions of Paulos, Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins et al., are serious about religion (usually, as it happens, either Catholicism or Judaism).
A pragmatic justification may be available for practical applications of analogy, notably in legal reasoning (§4.4).
Is a parallel pragmatic justification available for analogical arguments in general?
Reichenbach's justification of induction by enumeration is known as a pragmatic justification (see also Salmon 1967, 52 54).
But not even a pragmatic justification such as this could be offered for forces at the atomic level.
In the case of the identity theory, this pragmatic justification is, as has been pointed out before, guided by the principle of parsimony.
Thus, Feigl allows the possibility of a "pragmatic justification of the adoption of an alternative frame" (ibid., p. 386), thereby implying that there exists a plurality of alternative ethical systems.
