Sentence examples for possibility propositions from inspiring English sources

Avicenna wrote a brief summary of Aristotle's modal syllogistic, but his own theory was different, being based on the assumptions that the subject terms and the predicate terms of assertoric and modal propositions stand for all possible applications and the truth-conditions of assertoric propositions and corresponding possibility propositions are the same.

He also accepted syllogisms with possibility propositions as minor premises to be productive.

At various points, we find Avicenna presenting Aristotle's decisions (about mixes with possibility propositions as minor premises) as failures to implement general principles (Avicenna al-Masâ'il al-Gharîba: [1974] 94.20, 94.22, 95.52, 95.11 95.11).

There may well be difficulties of explaining how a proposition could be part of more than one concrete world (and why it would only be part of some concrete worlds but not all), but this framework seems to make conceptual room for the possibility propositions being true at worlds without being true in them.

The readings gave Râzî all the conversions mentioned in section 2.3.1 above except 1 (he took the absolute affirmative to convert as a possibility proposition).

This proof is open to Avicenna, given that he took first-figure syllogisms with a possibility proposition as its minor premise to be perfect, or nearly so; this syllogistic mix was rejected by most later logicians, along with the other proofs.

We will bracket these complications, though, and assume that, unless noted otherwise, the difference between centered and uncentered possibilities and propositions has no effect on the topic at issue.

Motivated by Section 4.2, in this appendix we discuss how the form of the double centralizer of a Lie algebra g ⊂ su ( k ) limits the possibilities for : Proposition 49 Let denote a subalgebra of su ( k ).

The idea is that, roughly, a proposition is at least as possible as each of the possibilities it comprises, and no more possible than the "most possible" possibility.

(2.1a) tells us that incremental confirmation is a matter of mutual reinforcement: a person who sees E as evidence for H invests more confidence in the possibility that both propositions are true than in either possibility in which only one obtains.

This reflects the idea that if one admits the possibility of a proposition's being half-true, one can no longer hold of every proposition without restriction that either it or its negation is true.