"In one example, it limits the use of insulting language, which could describe a significant portion of the language on the internet and is likely to lead to subjective prosecutions," he says.
There must, then, be some portion of ordinary language that can do all the work, vis-à-vis ontological commitment, that the first-order language was introduced to do.[39] This doesn't eliminate the need to seek paraphrases of ordinary language theories (see §4.2 below).
But such theories need not be paraphrased into the language of first-order predicate logic; it is enough if they are paraphrased into that regimented portion of ordinary language that can be counted on, in appropriate contexts, to be ontologically serious.
Some mathematical properties of the language are proven, for instance, that the proposed semantics is equivalent to that given earlier for the portion of the language without concurrency.
According to this method, we must first ask the philosopher to provide paraphrases of her statements into the regimented portion of our language, paraphrases that are acceptable by standards agreed to in advance.
The problem that needs to be addressed by the Quinean is then: how to recognize which quantifiers, or which uses of quantifiers, make up this ontologically serious portion of ordinary language.
But it is crucial to Quine's project that some portion of ordinary language can be used for ontologically serious discourse, and that when so used, quantification holds the key to ontological commitment.
This portion of ordinary language will have to undergo some regimentation if it is to have the full expressive power of first-order logic: there will need to be indefinitely many pronouns to serve as bound variables and sufficient punctuation to disambiguate structure.
The term, "well regulated militia" is the most important and debated portion of the language of the amendment.
