In keeping with the pluralism of meaningful predication (there is a plurality of things that we can meaningfully articulate judgments about), we cannot dogmatically presuppose that there is only one meaning of the 'being' addressed in our predicative activities.
It was a long while before he broke from the spell of Fichte's teachings and turned to philosophical realism, which asserts that underlying the world of appearances there is a plurality of things or "reals".
Firstly, it is argued that a plurality is always a plurality of things.
He never questions that the perceptible world ("the plurality of things") exists and is independent of our minds and our knowledge.
What Kant likely had in mind is nicely captured in a remark of Bennett's (1974, p. 83): to think of myself as a plurality of things is to think of my being conscious of this plurality, "and that pre-requires an undivided me".
Kant uses this difference to argue that since the quantity of matter consists in a plurality of real things external to each other that cannot fade away (as consciousness might), the only way to decrease its quantity is by division.
Saucedo (manuscript) defends a plural notion of fundamentality, and argues that the plurality of all things is a fundamental plurality, partly to accommodate both gunk and junk.
So there is now a new plurality of large things, A, B, C, L1, and L2.
By Self-Predication, F1 is F. Hence A, B, C and F1 are all F, and each is like the others in being F. Now consider the new plurality of F things, A, B, C, and F1.
Consider a plurality of F things, A, B, and C. By One-over-Many, each of A, B, C is F by virtue of partaking of a form of F-ness (say, F1).
By Self-Predication, F2 is F. Hence A, B, C, F1, and F2 are all F, and each is like the others in being F. Now consider the new plurality of F things, A, B, C, F1, and F2.
