(However, it hardly entails them; one can consistently be an alethic pluralist about truth, for instance, without necessarily having commitments to linguistic pluralism about truth predicates, or about concepts like fact or actuality).
New entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy treat pluralist theories of truth, abstract objects, and naturalism in classical Indian philosophy.
For more on pluralism, see e.g. the essays in Monnoyer (2007) and in Pedersen & Wright (2013); and the entry on pluralist theories of truth in this encyclopedia.
The foregoing varieties of pluralism are consistent with various further analyses of pluralists' ideas about truth.
In rejecting the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to truth, pluralists formulate a theory whose generality is guaranteed by accommodating the various properties F1, …, Fn by which true sentences come to be true in different regions of discourse.
The truth of pluralist, democratic politics is that there is no single, easily aligned "will of the people" but rather a complex bundle of competing interests.
For the pluralist, so too might truth be grounded as a plurality of more basic properties.
However, as noted in §4.2.3, the existence of such a property is not a devastating blow to all pluralists, since the domain-specific truth properties F1, …, Fn remain explanatorily basic in relation to the property of being F1, ∨ …, ∨ Fn.
For instance, pluralists may but need not hold that truth properties are simply one-place properties, since commitments to truth's being monadic are orthogonal to commitments to its being monistic.
But then, how is the pluralist going to account for the truth of the conjunction (Tappolet 2000: 384)?
