How do ignorant players learn to play equilibria if sophisticated players don't show them, because the sophisticated are incentivized to play equilibrium strategies until the ignorant have learned?
In situations where two steps are required, though, teams play equilibrium much more often.
The existing literature on team decision making has mainly focused on whether or not teams play equilibrium strategies more often than individuals, and our experiment can also answer this question affirmatively.
A woman in one solo keeps striking balances and brightly falling out of them, playing with equilibrium in a way that points the way to the style of the 20th-century George Balanchine.
Figure 13 State-grouped Markov chain for the transmitter and jammer playing Nash equilibrium (a,b).
Here, the red line shows the payoff obtained when both players are playing Nash equilibrium strategies.
Hence, estimating the factors that make "Nash-consistency" more likely does not only reveal which factors promote this type of consistency, but also which ones prevent decision makers from playing the equilibrium strategy and expecting their opponent to do the same.
Of course, if a player fears that other players have not learned equilibrium, this may well remove her incentive to play an equilibrium strategy herself.
Yet, for decisions with two rounds of iterated dominance teams choose (and think that they are expected to choose) more often the equilibrium-strategy. 13 Result 2: Overall, teams play the equilibrium strategy significantly more often than individuals.
Hence, in each step, every player plays an equilibrium strategy corresponding to that step.
